Integration, API & Data Exchange Centre
Internal workspace governing every API surface, file feed, webhook channel, and regulator-export route that exchanges data with BLACKSWAN Capital Markets OS — and the lineage that ties each one back to the 21-pack evidence spine. Every integration is classified, entitlement-gated, schema-versioned, encrypted, audit-logged, and counsel-bound where regulator-facing. Conservative posture: internal readiness only — not legal advice, not regulatory approval, not certification, not audit opinion, not regulator submission, not data-export authorization, not authorization for external launch.
Twelve integrations · class · direction · counterparty · entitlement
| ID | Integration | Class | Direction | Counterparty | Entitlement | Linked centres | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INT-AUTH-001 | Microsoft Entra OIDC (target) | Identity / Auth | Inbound | Identity Provider | All authenticated roles | Auth · Security Operations | Staging |
| INT-EV-PACK-002 | Evidence Pack API | REST · Internal | Outbound (read) | Internal · Auditor (engagement) | Evidence Owner · Auditor scope | All evidence packs · User Role posture | Production |
| INT-EXPORT-003 | Export Manifest API | REST · Restricted | Outbound | Regulator-review · Counsel-bounded | Counsel-locked per-recipient | Regulatory Exam Response · Policy Attestation | Counsel Review |
| INT-ROOM-004 | Stakeholder Room API | REST + room-link signing | Outbound | Client / Investor / Regulator-review | Per-share TTL · per-recipient signing | Data-Room MNPI · Client Lifecycle | Production |
| INT-WH-005 | Notification webhook | Webhook · HMAC | Outbound | Internal alerting + vendor | SRE · CISO | Incident · Production Monitoring | Production |
| INT-WH-006 | GitHub webhook · push / PR / release | Webhook · HMAC + short-lived token | Inbound | Source-control vendor | SRE · Release Control | Release Control · Approval & Sign-Off | Production |
| INT-EMAIL-007 | Email / notification connector | SMTP + provider API | Outbound | Email vendor (single-source watch) | SRE · Procurement | Vendor Risk · Outsourcing Concentration | Single-Source Watch |
| INT-OTEL-008 | Monitoring / SIEM push | OTel · mTLS | Outbound | SIEM + observability vendor | SRE · CISO | Production Monitoring · Security Operations | Production |
| INT-BILL-009 | Billing / payment integration | REST + webhook | Bi-directional | Payment processor | Finance · CFO sign-off | Revenue Recognition · Tax/VAT · Settlement Responsibility | Counsel Review |
| INT-KYC-010 | KYC partner feed | REST + signed file feed | Bi-directional | KYC vendor (contract pending) | Operations · Compliance | KYC/KYB Onboarding · Client Lifecycle · Vendor Risk | Design |
| INT-REG-011 | Regulator export channel | Signed file · counsel-locked | Outbound (one-off) | Regulator-review (per engagement) | External Counsel mandatory | Regulatory Exam Response · Regulatory Change · Jurisdiction Playbooks | Counsel Review |
| INT-TWIN-012 | Regulatory Digital Twin decision feed | Internal pub/sub | Internal | n/a (internal) | Counsel-locked phrasing | Regulatory Digital Twin Decision · Model Governance | Staging |
Ten stages · counsel-gated and entitlement-gated transitions
Spec drafted
Schema, auth method, data class, retention class, lineage scope drafted; RAID entry where touching regulator-facing data.
Sandbox build
Sandbox environment build with synthetic data only; never MNPI; rate limits set conservatively.
Staging dry-run
End-to-end run in staging; data quality validation; schema lint; replay/idempotency proven.
Counsel review
External counsel reviews regulator/client-facing wording, perimeter, and MNPI scope; locks phrasing.
Entitlement bind
Permission matrix (from User Role & Client Lifecycle Centres) bound to integration; least-privilege default.
Production cutover
Production deploy under change-control with rollback plan; per-recipient signing keys issued.
Continuous monitoring
SLO · error rate · schema drift · DLP · abuse-detection signals streamed to SIEM.
Degraded
Partial failure; runbook engaged; counsel notified for regulator-facing channels.
Deprecated
Newer version supersedes; sunset announced; clients migrated; per-recipient keys rotated on cut.
Retired / archived
Channel revoked; secrets rotated; 10-y audit retention; lineage frozen at last evidence hash.
Source / sink · data class · transport · auth · encryption · entitlement gate
| Channel | Direction | Source / Sink | Data class | Transport | Auth | Encryption | Entitlement gate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Auth tokens | Inbound | Entra OIDC | Internal · identity | HTTPS / OIDC | OIDC · PKCE | TLS 1.3 · JWT signed (KMS key-ID rotated) | All authenticated roles |
| Evidence pack read | Outbound | Internal · Auditor (engagement) | Restricted · per-pack DEK | HTTPS / REST | OIDC + ABAC | TLS 1.3 · per-pack DEK | Evidence Owner · Auditor scope |
| Export manifest | Outbound | Regulator-review · counsel-bounded | Restricted · counsel-locked | HTTPS / REST + signed file | OIDC + ABAC + room-link signing | TLS 1.3 · KMS-signed manifest | External Counsel countersign |
| Stakeholder room share | Outbound | Client / Investor / Regulator-review | Restricted · MNPI-binding | HTTPS / REST | OIDC + per-share TTL | TLS 1.3 · per-recipient link signing | Per-share access review |
| Notification webhook | Outbound | Internal alerting + vendor | Internal | HTTPS / webhook | HMAC + OIDC | TLS 1.3 · webhook secret rotated 180d | SRE / CISO |
| GitHub webhook | Inbound | Source-control vendor | Internal | HTTPS / webhook | HMAC + short-lived token | TLS 1.3 · payload signed | SRE |
| Email / notification | Outbound | Email vendor | Internal · per-recipient address | SMTP + provider API | API key (KMS-stored) | TLS 1.3 · DKIM/DMARC | Internal only |
| Monitoring / SIEM | Outbound | SIEM vendor | Internal (logs) | OTel / mTLS | mTLS | mTLS · payload encrypted at rest | SRE / CISO |
| Billing event | Bi-directional | Payment processor | Internal · PCI-out-of-scope | HTTPS / REST + webhook | API key + HMAC | TLS 1.3 · PCI-out-of-scope | Finance · CFO sign-off |
| KYC partner feed | Bi-directional | KYC vendor | Personal · KYB | HTTPS / REST + signed file feed | OIDC + API key | TLS 1.3 · DPA/SCC enforced | Operations · Compliance |
| Regulator export | Outbound (one-off) | Regulator (per engagement) | Restricted · counsel-locked | Signed file · counsel-approved channel | Counsel-locked recipient ledger | TLS 1.3 · KMS-signed | External Counsel mandatory |
| Digital Twin feed | Internal pub/sub | Internal | Internal · counsel-locked phrasing | Internal pub/sub | OIDC service-to-service | TLS 1.3 · KMS-signed | Counsel-locked phrasing |
Integration → primary evidence pack(s) → owner · 21-pack alignment
| Integration | Primary evidence pack(s) | Linked centre(s) | Owner | Counsel countersign |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| INT-AUTH-001 (Entra OIDC) | Auth · Policy Attestation | Security Operations · User Role/Permissions | Identity Lead · CISO | For regulator-facing artefact |
| INT-EV-PACK-002 (Evidence Pack API) | Control Testing · Board-Pack Attestation | All 21 evidence packs · User Role posture | Head of Evidence | For external-facing read |
| INT-EXPORT-003 (Export Manifest API) | Regulatory Exam Response · Policy Attestation | Regulatory Escalation · Jurisdiction Playbooks | External Counsel · Head of Evidence | Yes — mandatory |
| INT-ROOM-004 (Stakeholder Room API) | Data-Room MNPI Access · Policy Attestation | Stakeholder Rooms · Client Lifecycle | CISO · Head of Stakeholder Rooms | For external-facing share |
| INT-WH-005 (Notification webhook) | Incident · Control Testing | Production Monitoring · Security Operations | SRE Lead · CISO | For regulator-notify path |
| INT-WH-006 (GitHub webhook) | Control Testing · Policy Attestation | Release Control · Approval & Sign-Off | SRE Lead | n/a (internal) |
| INT-EMAIL-007 (Email connector) | Outsourcing Concentration · Policy Attestation | Vendor Risk · Enterprise Architecture | SRE Lead · Procurement | For external comms |
| INT-OTEL-008 (Monitoring / SIEM) | Control Testing · Incident | Production Monitoring · Security Operations | SRE Lead · CISO | n/a (internal) |
| INT-BILL-009 (Billing / payment) | Revenue Recognition · Tax/VAT · Settlement Responsibility | Financial Controls · Commercial Readiness | CFO · External Auditor | Yes — per artefact |
| INT-KYC-010 (KYC partner feed) | KYC/KYB Onboarding · Partner-Route Assurance · Outsourcing Concentration | Client Lifecycle · Vendor Risk · Commercial Readiness | Operations · Compliance · External Counsel | Yes — mandatory |
| INT-REG-011 (Regulator export channel) | Regulatory Exam Response · Regulatory Change | Regulatory Escalation · Jurisdiction Playbooks | External Counsel · Head of Regulatory | Yes — mandatory |
| INT-TWIN-012 (Digital Twin feed) | Regulatory Digital Twin Decision · Model Risk · Conduct Risk MI | Model Governance · Regulatory Change Horizon | CISO · Head of Regulatory | Yes — for external use |
Ten control checks · enforced before any data leaves internal scope
| Check | What it enforces | Owner | Linked policy / control | Failure handling |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Auth identity | Caller bound to a known identity (Entra OIDC target · staging factors today) | Tech/Security | POL-001 Auth · CTL-001 MFA | 401 · auth-event tag · paged on burst |
| Entitlement gate | Caller's role / classification authorised for the requested pack & action | Tech/Security · Compliance | POL-018 Policy Attestation · CTL-004 | 403 · denied-event tag |
| Schema validation | Payload conforms to versioned schema; unknown / drift rejected | SRE Lead | POL-006 Control Testing | 422 · schema-drift event |
| Idempotency / replay | Idempotency key required on writes; replay window enforced; duplicates rejected | SRE Lead | POL-006 Control Testing | 409 · replay event tag |
| Rate limit | Per-route / per-tenant rate-limit; abuse-detection on burst | SRE Lead · CISO | POL-012 Incident · CTL-WAF | 429 · auto-page on sustained |
| Data quality | Required fields · sanity ranges · referential integrity | SRE Lead · Evidence Owner | POL-006 Control Testing | 422 · quality-fail event |
| Encryption / TLS | TLS 1.3 minimum · KMS-managed keys · per-pack DEK where restricted | Tech/Security | POL-018 Policy Attestation · CTL-006 | Connection refused · key-error event |
| Secrets handling | No plain-text secrets in repo; secret-scan on every commit; KMS-stored at runtime | SRE Lead · CISO | POL-018 · CTL-006 | Block-on-detect · rotation |
| DLP / egress watch | Restricted-class data flagged on outbound; ABAC denies enforced | Data Governance Lead · CISO | POL-003 MNPI · CTL-003 · CTL-006 | Block · auto-page CISO |
| Audit log | Every request & response (header-only) audit-logged with hash & recipient | SRE Lead · CISO | POL-012 · POL-018 · CTL-006 | Retained 10y · counsel-bounded export |
Nine views · each role's experience of the integration surface
Full integration board
Reads the full integration inventory; approves Tier-1 cutovers; dual sign-off with Tech/Security on production transitions.
Owner view
Owns auth, schema, encryption, secrets, rate limits, idempotency, DLP, audit. JIT elevation for break-glass; dual sign-off on regulator-facing.
Counsel-bound view
Counsel countersign authority on regulator/client-facing artefacts (Export Manifest API, Regulator Export, Billing-revenue narrative).
Operator view
Runs day-to-day integrations; manages KYC partner feed, billing webhook, room shares; approve on activation.
Evidence-bound view
Writes the lineage updates per integration; per-file limitation footer enforced; freshness / hash captured on every release.
Per-tenant view
Reads only their per-pilot tenant's integration ledger; signs DPA / SCC; receives signed room-link feeds. No cross-tenant visibility.
Regulator-room view
Read-only on counsel-locked, redacted exports only; per-engagement TTL; per-recipient watermark; audit-logged access.
Engagement-scope view
Reads engagement-scope evidence on Evidence Pack API and Billing event; engagement letter required; counsel-bounded scope.
Partner integration view
Tied to Vendor Risk + Outsourcing Concentration: every external connector carries vendor classification, DPA/SCC posture, exit-plan readiness.
Transition · gate · evidence captured · owner
| Transition | Gate | Acceptance criteria | Evidence captured | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Design → Sandbox | Schema + auth method approved | Schema versioned · auth class decided · RAID entry if regulator-touch | Spec hash · RAID reference | Tech/Security · Compliance |
| Sandbox → Staging | Synthetic-data dry-run | Replay / idempotency / quality checks pass · zero plain-text secrets | Sandbox test report | SRE Lead |
| Staging → Counsel | Counsel-bound | External counsel reviews regulator-facing language · perimeter alignment | Counsel countersign hash (CTL-010) | External Counsel · Compliance |
| Counsel → Entitlement | Permission bind | Permission matrix from User Role + Client Lifecycle Centres applied; least-privilege | Entitlement ledger | Tech/Security · Compliance |
| Entitlement → Production | Change-control sign-off | Release Control dual sign-off · rollback plan · per-recipient signing keys issued | Change record · cutover audit-event tag | SRE Lead · Programme Manager · CISO |
| Production → Monitor | SLO / DLP / abuse | SLO healthy · DLP active · abuse-detect baseline set · audit-log retained 10y | SIEM index · SLO report | SRE Lead · CISO |
| Monitor → Degraded | Auto-page on threshold | Severity classified · runbook engaged · counsel notified if regulator-facing | Incident timeline · paging log | SRE · CISO · Compliance |
| Degraded → Production (recovery) | Post-incident review | Root cause logged · controls tightened · audit-event family preserved | Post-mortem · evidence pack diff | SRE Lead · CISO |
| Production → Deprecated | Sunset announce + migration plan | Clients notified · keys rotated on cut · evidence captured | Sunset notice · migration log | SRE Lead · Operations |
| Deprecated → Retired | Channel revoked | Secrets rotated · audit retained 10y · lineage frozen at last evidence hash | Retirement manifest hash | SRE Lead · Tech/Security · Compliance |
Open exceptions · owner · remediation
| Alert ID | Integration | Issue | Severity | Owner | Remediation path | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INT-WH-EMAIL-STALE | INT-EMAIL-007 Email connector | Single-source vendor concentration (FCA OpRes / DORA watch) | P2 | SRE Lead · Procurement | Add dual-provider readiness · failover drill (RAID-009) | Watch |
| INT-EXPORT-COUNSEL | INT-EXPORT-003 Export Manifest API | Counsel rule-pack countersign pending (2026-05-19 session) | P0 | Head of Regulatory · External Counsel | Lock phrasing after counsel session | Counsel Pending |
| INT-BILL-AUDIT | INT-BILL-009 Billing / payment | External auditor engagement letter pending (RAID-006) | P1 | CFO · External Auditor | Sign engagement letter | Auditor Pending |
| INT-KYC-CONTRACT | INT-KYC-010 KYC partner feed | KYC partner contract sign-off open | P0 | Head of Commercial · External Counsel | Close KYC contract before any client activation | Counsel Pending |
| INT-MON-STALE | INT-OTEL-008 Monitoring / SIEM | v1 endpoint fallback still pinned (stale) | P3 | SRE Lead | Migrate to v2 only · remove v1 fallback | Stale |
| INT-EV-SCHEMA-DRIFT | INT-EV-PACK-002 Evidence Pack API | Two unsigned schema changes flagged in last sweep | P2 | Evidence Owner · SRE Lead | Re-attest schemas; re-test against curated pack set | Drift |
| INT-BG-OVERDUE | Cross-integration break-glass | Quarterly break-glass drill overdue (target 2026-05-12) | P2 | Tech/Security · COO | Schedule drill · capture evidence · revoke | Overdue |
Four gates · all green before any external data exchange leaves internal scope
Counsel countersign
External counsel countersigns every regulator-/client-facing integration artefact (CTL-010) before per-recipient signing keys are issued.
Entitlement bound
Caller's role + client classification explicitly permits the request per User Role & Client Lifecycle matrices; least-privilege default.
Data lineage hashed
Payload's lineage hash + freshness date captured; cross-Centre links current; audit-event tag applied; per-pack DEK in place where restricted.
Revocation readiness
Single-action revocation pulls all per-recipient keys, channel webhooks, and audit-log forwarders; offboarding runbook proven on rotation drill.
Ingress · edge · mTLS · partner-route controls · presence · approval · route exposure · evidence
/api/production-ingress-route-readiness, in the fixture, or in any commit. Only ownership, declared (non-secret) env-key NAMES, presence flags, approval state, route exposure state, evidence references, and unlock criteria are recorded. The staging hostname does not count as a production endpoint. Internal ingress / partner-route readiness posture only — not security certification, not regulatory approval, not legal advice, not audit opinion, not compliance certification, not regulator submission, not permission grant, not launch authorisation, not client acceptance, not capital/liquidity adequacy, not external endpoint authorisation, and not external-use authorisation.
Controls assessed
20
Internal-ready
0
In review
3
Blocked / missing
15
Restricted review
1
External-route blocked
16
Route monitoring pending
2
Production launch
HOLD · NO-GO
| Control | Group | Owner | State | Approval | Route exposure | Evidence | Last reviewed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production hostname registration & ownership proof PRODUCTION_HOSTNAME_OWNERSHIP_REF | Hostname & DNS | Platform Lead · CISO | Missing | Pending | External-blocked | ING-DNS-001 | 2026-05-19 |
| Production DNS zone custody & DNSSEC / CAA posture PRODUCTION_DNS_ZONE_REF | Hostname & DNS | Platform Lead · SRE | Missing | In review | External-blocked | ING-DNS-002 | 2026-05-18 |
| Production TLS certificate issuance custody PRODUCTION_TLS_CERT_CUSTODY_REF | TLS lifecycle | Platform Lead · CISO | Missing | Pending | External-blocked | ING-TLS-001 | 2026-05-18 |
| TLS certificate renewal & expiry monitor TLS_RENEWAL_MONITOR_REF | TLS lifecycle | Platform Lead · SRE | Missing | Pending | External-blocked | ING-TLS-002 | 2026-05-18 |
| WAF policy bound to production hostnames PRODUCTION_WAF_BINDING_REF | WAF · security edge | Platform Lead · CISO | Missing | In review | External-blocked | ING-WAF-001 | 2026-05-19 |
| Bot / credential-stuffing / abuse mitigation BOT_ABUSE_RULESET_REF | WAF · security edge | Platform Lead · CISO | In review | In review | External-blocked | ING-WAF-002 | 2026-05-17 |
| CDN / edge routing binding PRODUCTION_CDN_BINDING_REF | CDN · edge routing | Platform Lead · SRE | Missing | Pending | External-blocked | ING-CDN-001 | 2026-05-18 |
| API gateway / ingress controller binding PRODUCTION_API_GATEWAY_REF | API gateway / ingress | Platform Lead | Missing | Pending | External-blocked | ING-GW-001 | 2026-05-18 |
| Route-level authentication via Entra OIDC PRODUCTION_API_AUTH_BINDING_REF | API gateway / ingress | CISO · Identity Lead | Blocked | Blocked | External-blocked | ING-GW-002 | 2026-05-18 |
| mTLS / partner certificate issuance & custody PARTNER_MTLS_CUSTODY_REF | mTLS · partner custody | Platform Lead · CISO · Partner Risk | Missing | Pending | Restricted-review | ING-MTLS-001 | 2026-05-17 |
| mTLS / partner certificate rotation & revocation drill PARTNER_MTLS_ROTATION_REF | mTLS · partner custody | Platform Lead · Partner Risk | Missing | Pending | Restricted-review | ING-MTLS-002 | 2026-05-17 |
| Partner-route allowlist & contract scope PARTNER_ROUTE_ALLOWLIST_REF | Partner allowlist | Operations · Partner Risk · Legal | Restricted review | In review | Restricted-review | ING-PART-001 | 2026-05-15 |
| Partner callback / webhook signature & replay protection PARTNER_CALLBACK_SIGNATURE_POLICY_REF | Partner callback | Platform Lead · Partner Risk | Missing | Pending | External-blocked | ING-PART-002 | 2026-05-16 |
| Rate-limit policy & burst caps PRODUCTION_RATELIMIT_POLICY_REF | Rate limit · abuse | Platform Lead · SRE | In review | In review | External-blocked | ING-RATE-001 | 2026-05-17 |
| Abuse-event runbook & containment ABUSE_EVENT_RUNBOOK_REF | Rate limit · abuse | Platform Lead · CISO · SOC | Missing | Pending | External-blocked | ING-RATE-002 | 2026-05-15 |
| Route-level monitoring & telemetry forwarding ROUTE_MONITORING_BINDING_REF | Route monitoring | Platform Lead · SRE | In review | In review | External-blocked | ING-MON-001 | 2026-05-18 |
| Route-level audit log forwarding ROUTE_AUDIT_FORWARDING_REF | Route monitoring | CISO · SOC | Missing | Pending | External-blocked | ING-MON-002 | 2026-05-17 |
| Production rollback / failover route drill ROLLBACK_FAILOVER_DRILL_REF | Rollback · failover | Platform Lead · SRE · COO | Missing | In review | External-blocked | ING-ROLL-001 | 2026-05-16 |
| External-route go-live authority custody EXTERNAL_ROUTE_AUTHORITY_REF | External-route authority | Founder Office · CISO · Compliance · CFO | Blocked | Blocked | External-blocked | ING-AUTH-001 | 2026-05-15 |
| Staging URL quarantine label (no env key — staging-only) | External-route authority | Platform Lead · CISO | Not applicable (staging only) | Approved · internal | Internal-only | ING-STAGING-QUARANTINE-001 | 2026-05-19 |
Read-only fixture exposed at /api/production-ingress-route-readiness; presence flags + non-secret env-key NAMES only. Cross-references /api/production-config-readiness, /api/entra-oidc-readiness, and /api/auth/posture. Mirrored summary in the Security Operations · IAM · Zero-Trust Centre, the Final Production Launch Control Tower, the Production Monitoring Centre, and the Completeness Command Centre. Internal ingress / partner-route readiness posture only — not external endpoint authorisation, not regulator approval, not external-use authorisation. The staging hostname does not count as a production endpoint.
Audit log of integration / data-exchange events
| Timestamp (UTC) | Actor | Event family | Action | Evidence hash | Limitation recorded | Next step |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-08 09:00 | SRE Lead · CISO · Compliance | API taxonomy | IADE-TAX — 12 integrations catalogued | sha256:iade…aa01 | "Internal readiness only." | Quarterly review |
| 2026-05-09 11:14 | Programme · SRE Lead | Lifecycle model | IADE-LIFE — 10 stages published | sha256:iade…aa02 | "Internal." | Apply on next integration |
| 2026-05-10 09:22 | Tech/Security · Data Governance | Exchange map | IADE-EX — 12 channels mapped | sha256:iade…aa03 | "Internal." | Refresh on encryption/key rotation |
| 2026-05-11 14:08 | Head of Evidence · CISO | Evidence lineage | IADE-LN — 12 lineage rows mapped | sha256:iade…aa04 | "Internal." | Refresh on schema change |
| 2026-05-12 09:50 | SRE Lead · CISO · Compliance | Control checks | IADE-CC — 10 control checks logged | sha256:iade…aa05 | "Internal." | Re-test quarterly |
| 2026-05-13 11:42 | CoS · CISO · Compliance | Stakeholder views | IADE-SV — 9 views scoped | sha256:iade…aa06 | "Counsel-bounded for external." | Lock per-share counsel sign-off |
| 2026-05-14 08:18 | Programme · SRE Lead · Compliance | Acceptance criteria | IADE-ACC — 10 transitions defined | sha256:iade…aa07 | "Internal." | Apply on next cutover |
| 2026-05-15 09:00 | SRE Lead | Stale / broken sweep | IADE-AL — 7 alerts opened | sha256:iade…aa08 | "Internal." | Close break-glass drill |
| 2026-05-15 11:30 | External Counsel · CEO · Tech/Security | External / data-export gates | IADE-VG — 3 of 4 gates met | sha256:iade…aa09 | "No external exchange without all 4 gates." | Close Gate 1 post 2026-05-19 |
| 2026-05-16 07:55 | CEO · CISO · Compliance | Centre attestation | IADE-ATTESTATION — monthly attestation | sha256:iade…aa10 | "Internal; not regulatory approval." | Re-attest monthly |
What this Centre is — and is not
- Staging / simulated integration data. All integration IDs, lineage rows, control checks, evidence hashes, dates, and audit events shown here are seed values for an internal readiness workflow. They are not a live API gateway, not a live SIEM, and not a live audit log.
- Internal readiness workflow only. This Centre captures BLACKSWAN's internal integration posture. It is not legal advice, not regulatory approval, not certification, not an audit opinion, not regulator submission, not data-export authorization, and not authorization for external launch.
- Counsel-bound by default for external surfaces. Every regulator- or client-facing integration artefact requires external counsel countersign (CTL-010) before any external visibility / data-export gate is opened.
- Least-privilege by default. Where the permission matrix from User Role & Client Lifecycle Centres does not explicitly grant access, the default is Deny. Counsel-locked phrasing applies to every regulator-facing payload.
- Founder-root is a standing accepted risk. Per Programme Decision Log DEC-005, founder-root permanence carries MFA + re-auth + monthly attestation as compensating controls.